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Comments on neurobiology, neuroimaging, and psychiatry from a skeptical neuroscientist.

Neuroskeptic
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  • February 10, 2012
  • 03:40 AM
  • 64 views

Good Science, Bad History, in the British Journal of Psychiatry

by Neuroskeptic in Neuroskeptic

The latest February 2012 issue of the British Journal of Psychiatry features a paper about the association between child abuse and later mental health problems. I haven't read it yet, but it looks pretty good.However, it also includes an editorial from John Read and Richard Bentall which argues that: Just 20 years ago, however, it would have been difficult to get the paper published. Mental health professions have been slow, even resistant, to recognise the role of childhood adversities in psychiatric disorder... Until very recently the hypothesis that abuse in childhood has a causal role in psychosis was regarded by many biologically oriented psychiatrists as heresy...Really? I checked the BJP from exactly 20 years ago. The February 1992 issue contained:A paper about child sexual abuse in female psychiatric patients.A letter praising a different article, on the same topic.A review of 11 studies on psychosocial family interventions as treatments for schizophrenia.A paper looking at the effect of the social environment on symptoms of schizophrenia.Four strikes and they're out. It's not true that this kind of thing wasn't being discussed 20 years ago.Such grandstanding is bad for science. Few would deny that psychiatry in recent years has undervalued psychosocial factors and overvalued genetics and neuroscience, but it's actually quite a complicated story, not a Punch and Judy show with bad guys on one side and good guys on the other.Rhetorical flourishes like this editorial certainly get attention but in the long run, down that road lies madness.Read, J., and Bentall, R. (2012). Negative childhood experiences and mental health: theoretical, clinical and primary prevention implications The British Journal of Psychiatry, 200 (2), 89-91 DOI: 10.1192/bjp.bp.111.096727... Read more »

  • February 8, 2012
  • 03:33 AM
  • 72 views

Visualizing The Connected Brain

by Neuroskeptic in Neuroskeptic

So it seems as though the "connectome" is the latest big thing in neuroscience. This is the brain's wiring diagram, in terms of the connections between neurons and on a larger scale, between brain regions.We certainly won't understand the brain without getting to grips with the connections but equally, it's not the whole story. I previously emphasised that the brain is not made of soup; it's not made of spaghetti, either.Connectomics does however unquestionably provide some of the prettiest images in neuroscience. And they just got prettier, with a new technique for visualizing connections, just revealed in Neuroimage: Circular representation of human cortical networks for subject and population-level connectomic visualization.See above. It's a rather lovely vista (for which the authors Irimia et al share credit with the folks behind the Circos visualization tool they used).All you need are some MRI scans, and a lot of image processing, and you can produce one of these "Connectograms". But what does it mean? Here's the authors' description:The outermost ring shows the various brain regions arranged by lobe (fr — frontal; ins — insula; lim — limbic; tem — temporal; par — parietal; occ — occipital; nc — non-cortical; bs — brain stem; CeB — cerebellum) and further ordered anterior-to-posterior. The color map of each region is lobe-specific and maps to the color of each regional parcellation.In other words, the outer ring is just a list of brain regions, each with an assigned colour. The inner rings tell us about those regions: Proceeding inward towards the center of the circle, these measures are: total GM volume, total area of the surface associated with the GM–WM interface (at the base of the cortical ribbon), mean cortical thickness, mean curvature and connectivity per unit volume. For non-cortical regions, only average regional volume is shown.So each of the five inner rings displays data about one aspect of brain anatomy, for each of the regions. The colors are a heat map of the numbers.Finally, the lines between regions represent the degrees of connectivity between regions via white matter tracts, as measured with diffusion tensor imaging:The links represent the computed degrees of connectivity between segmented brain regions. Links shaded in blue represent DTI tractography pathways in the lower third of the distribution of FA, green lines the middle third, and red lines the top third (see text for details). You can also make a pooled connectogram of the average neuroanatomy across a group of people. Still, it remains to be seen whether these are as useful as they are beautiful.Irimia A, Chambers MC, Torgerson CM, and Van Horn JD (2012). Circular representation of human cortical networks for subject and population-level connectomic visualization. NeuroImage PMID: 22305988... Read more »

  • February 5, 2012
  • 04:32 AM
  • 64 views

Psychiatry's True Blood? Pt 1.

by Neuroskeptic in Neuroskeptic

Imagine that there was a blood test that could detect depression. Wouldn't that be useful?It depends.Ridge Diagnostics are a US company who offer such a test. They've just published some results of the technology in Molecular Psychiatry. In two samples of patients with major depressive disorder (MDD), they report differences in the"MDDScore", between the patients and healthy controls.The MDDScore is an aggregate value, calculated from the levels of 9 metabolites in blood serum. They're all well-known molecules, including hormones, such as cortisol and prolactin. The novelty is in how they're put together to make the MDDScore. We're given equations - but the key variables are not provided, because they're proprietary:Long-term Neuroskeptic readers will recall that this "secret ingredients" approach to publishing science was also adopted by another company offering a different depression test.Anyway, the performance of the test was impressive. In both the pilot and the replication samples, the MDDScore was significantly higher in the depressed people than in the controls. In both cases, the test had a sensitivity of over 91% and a specificity of over 81%, which is pretty good. Ridge Diagnostics are already offering the MDDScore clinically. For $745 a pop.However...Although there were two depressed patient groups (n=36 and 34), there was only one set of controls (n=43); both patient samples were compared to it. This means the second, "replication", test was not fully independent of the first one. If the first finding was a fluke caused by the control group having weird results by chance, for instance, then the second study would just repeat the fluke.The patients were significantly older, and with a higher BMI, than the controls. They did control for these variables, which is good, but this raises the question of whether these folks differed in other ways, that they didn't measure, and hence couldn't control for.In both samples, the patients had a very significantly higher MDDScore than the controls (p less than 0.0001, both times). But in both cases, the difference in levels of EGF (epidermal growth factor) was almost as strong: p=0.0003 and p less than 0.0001, respectively. Other metabolites weren't far behind. Testing for EGF would almost certainly be cheaper than getting an MDDScore.Finally, all these data demonstrate is that the test can distinguish between people with MDD and entirely healthy people. But how often are doctors going to need to do that? More likely, they'll want to distinguish depression from other things that are often confused with it, such as: bipolar disorder, anxiety disorders, chronic fatigue syndrome, bereavement, "stress", and all manner of physical illnesses e.g. thyroid problems. Daniel Carlat said last year that If the test cannot distinguish different psychiatric problems, then the MDDScore is simply a non-specific "biomarker" for emotional difficulties of all stripes, and would be essentially useless. How disorder-specific is the MDDScore? This paper doesn't tell us. And to date, this is the only published paper mentioning the MDDScore. The website mentions some conference presentations, but none have yet appeared in a peer reviewed journal.Ridge Diagnostics have an interesting history. But that's another story - stay tuned for Part 2.Papakostas, G., Shelton, R., Kinrys, G., Henry, M., Bakow, B., Lipkin, S., Pi, B., Thurmond, L., and Bilello, J. (2011). Assessment of a multi-assay, serum-based biological diagnostic test for major depressive disorder: a Pilot and Replication Study Molecular Psychiatry DOI: 10.1038/mp.2011.166... Read more »

  • February 2, 2012
  • 02:22 AM
  • 100 views

Science Majors are from Mars...

by Neuroskeptic in Neuroskeptic

According to a new study, students with a family history of autism tend to major in math and science, while substance abuse and depression are more common in the ancestors of humanities fans.In an online survey, over 1,000 new Princeton undergrads were asked about their intended major and whether anyone in their family had been diagnosed with one of 16 neurological and psychiatric disorders. More details here.Of the 16 maladies, 5 were so rare that there wasn't enough data to analyze. Of the remaining 11, there were significant differences between the three types of students in four. The categories being humanities, social sciences, and "technical" i.e. science, engineering and maths. Social science majors were in the middle, except for autism.See the graph I made above.It's an interesting study. The autism result seems tenuous though because only 24 of 1077 students reported any autism in their immediate family. That's 3% of "technical" students and 1% of others, so not very many. The authors excluded schizophrenia and epilepsy from the analysis on the grounds of being too rare - and they had 18 each. Substance abuse and depression had over 150 each, so those differences are rather more solid.The authors note that this fits with various previous studies and they discuss their findings in Baron-Cohen-esque terms:It has been suggested that autism represents an extreme manifestation of a ‘‘systemizing’’ nature. Since ASDs have complex inheritance, shared genetic variation between close relatives might establish a continuous phenotype which in milder forms confers interest or benefits in understanding highly structured fields... Similarly, affective disorders may represent an extreme phenotype of emotional lability that, in milder forms, is commensurate with interest in the humanities.Hmm. OK, but does that really make sense? Sure, it fits with the popular image of the Geeky Scientist vs the Tortured Artist - but that's not science, that's stereotypes. Why would emotional lability make you favor the humanities, exactly?Imagine if the stereotype was the Geeky Artist vs the Tortured Scientist (and there really have been plenty of both, over the years). Couldn't we rationalize that equally well?"People with autistic traits are drawn to study the humanities because they wish to learn about humans and their emotions, something they find hard to do in day-to-day life... While emotionally volatile people like science and maths because they offer a calming sense of order and stability..."Campbell BC, and Wang SS (2012). Familial Linkage between Neuropsychiatric Disorders and Intellectual Interests. PloS one, 7 (1) PMID: 22291951... Read more »

  • January 31, 2012
  • 03:29 AM
  • 131 views

Voodoo Neuroscience Revisited

by Neuroskeptic in Neuroskeptic

Two years ago, neuroscientists were shaken by the appearance of a draft paper showing that half of the published work in a particular field had fallen prey to a major statistical error.Originally called "Voodoo Correlations in Social Neuroscience", it ended up with the less snappy name of Puzzlingly high correlations in fMRI studies of emotion, personality, and social cognition. I prefer the old title.The error in question is now known variously as the "circular analysis problem", "non-independence problem" or "double-dipping" although I still call it the "voodoo problem". In a nutshell it arises whenever you take a large set of data, search for data points which are statistically significantly different from some baseline (null hypothesis), and then go on to perform further statistics only on those significant data points.The problem is that when you picked out the statistically significant observations, you selected the data points that were especially "good", so if you then do some more analyses only on those data, you are almost guaranteed to find something "good". To avoid this you need to make sure that your second analysis is truly independent of your first one.Anyway, Vul and Pashler, the main authors of the original voodoo article, have just written a short piece in NeuroImage offering some reflections on the paper and the aftermath. They don't make any major new arguments but it's a good read. Particularly fun is their explanation of what inspired them to look into the voodoo problem:In early 2005 a speaker in our department reported that BOLD activity in a small region of the brain can account for the great majority of the variance in speed with which subjects walk out of the experiment several hours later (this finding was never published as far as we know). The implications of this result struck us as puzzling, to say the least: Are walking speeds really so reliable that most of their variability can be predicted? Does a focal cortical region determine walking speeds? Are walking speeds largely predetermined hours in advance? These implications all struck us as far-fetched...But they reveal that it was one paper in particular that set them off voodoo-hunting Our interest in probing the matter was further whetted by an episode occurring a short while later: Grill-Spector et al. (2006) reported that individual voxels in face selective regions have a variety of stable stimulus preferences; in a critical commentary, Baker et al. (2007) found that the analysis used to ascertain this fact implicitly built these conclusions into the method, such that the same analysis applied to noise data (voxels from the nasal cavity) revealed a similar variety of stable preferences. It occurred to us that a similar circularity might underlie the puzzlingly high correlations.To their credit, Grill-Spector et al quickly accepted Baker et al's criticism and admitted that some of their original conclusions had been wrong.Vul, E., and Pashler, H. (2012). Voodoo and circularity errors NeuroImage DOI: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2012.01.027... Read more »

  • January 26, 2012
  • 03:02 AM
  • 142 views

Take Your Placebos, Or Die

by Neuroskeptic in Neuroskeptic

People who take their medication as directed are less likely to die - even when that "medication" is just a sugar pill.This is the surprising finding of a paper just published, Adherence to placebo and mortality in the Beta Blocker Evaluation of Survival Trial (BEST).BEST was a clinical trial of beta blockers, drugs used in certain kinds of heart disease. The patients were aged about 60 and they all suffered from heart failure. Everyone was randomly assigned to get a beta blocker or placebo, then followed up for 3 years to see how they did.Here's the big finding: in the placebo group of 1174 patients, the people who took all of their placebo pills on time (the good adherers), were significantly less likely to die than the patients who missed lots of doses. People who took over 75% as directed were 40% less likely to die than those with less than 75% adherence:That's pretty interesting. The pills were placebos - they can't have had any benefit. So what's going on? It gets even better. You might be tempted to write off these results as obvious: "Clearly, people who follow the study instructions are just 'healthy' people in other ways - maybe they take more exercise, eat better, etc. and that's what protects them."Certainly, that's what I'd have said.... Read more »

  • January 25, 2012
  • 03:59 AM
  • 143 views

The Hidden Face Within

by Neuroskeptic in Neuroskeptic

One of these two images contains a hidden picture of a face. Which one?This was the question faced by participants in a remarkable psychology experiment just published, Measuring Internal Representations from Behavioral and Brain Data. Five healthy volunteers were presented with a series of random black and white grid patterns. Each grid square was either black or white, and this was randomly determined on each trial.There was no pattern to the images, they were completely random. But the subjects were told that half of the patterns contained a hidden face, and that their job was to work out which ones did. Each subject saw over 10,000 random images and they took about 1 second to judge each one. The volunteers "detected" a face in 44% of the images. Somehow, all five of them convinced themselves that they were seeing faces in many of the grids. The authors say thatUpon completion of the experiment we debriefed observers, and all expressed shock that no face was ever presented.That's strange enough in itself, but here's the really clever bit. The authors compared the patterns which were declared to contain a face, to the ones that were reported as empty. The image below shows the average "face" grid, minus the average "non face" grid, for each individual subject: As you can see, this reveals...a face! Kind of. The top half shows the raw average; the bottom half shows the statistically significant differences from random noise.In Subjects 1 and 2, the face is pretty clear, with eyes, a nose and a mouth. For 3 and 4, it's less coherent, but you might be able to see it if you look hard enough. For Subject 5, not really. What this means is that people (at least, most of them) were not just seeing faces in any noise. They tended to see faces when the random patterns happened to resemble a kind of primitive face, but it was a different face for each person. The authors say that these strange faces correspond to the individual's internal representations, or models, of "a face", that each subject was "seeing" in the noise.Finally, the whole experiment was conducted while EEG data was being recorded from the participant's brains. The EEG results revealed that there was a clear difference in the neural activity associated with "face" compared to "nonface" stimuli - except in Subject 5, who you'll remember had the least coherent "internal face".What's exciting about this approach is that it investigates perception in a purely "top down" way. Normally, when we look at anything, what we end up perceiving is a product of "bottom up" influences - the raw data - and "top down" ones - what we expect to see. In this experiment, there was no real "bottom up" data; it was all "top down".This is a form of pareidolia - perceiving familiar things in random stimuli. Seeing the face of Jesus in your sock, that kind of thing. It works for sounds too: in the famous White Christmas Experiment, people report "hearing" music in pure white noise - when told to expect it. Real-life examples of this include the "Islam Is The Light" doll, and my personal favorite, the singing paedophile Christmas mouse.Finally, I wonder what embodied cognition theorists make of this paper. Because this paper claims to be "Measuring Internal Representations from Behavioral and Brain Data"; embodied cognition (at least the radical kind) is the theory that "internal representations" either don't exist, or at least don't explain anything about human cognition.Smith, M., Gosselin, F., and Schyns, P. (2012). Measuring Internal Representations from Behavioral and Brain Data Current Biology DOI: 10.1016/j.cub.2011.11.061... Read more »

  • January 21, 2012
  • 12:23 PM
  • 135 views

The Trojan Horses of Medicine

by Neuroskeptic in Neuroskeptic

Dodgy science is being smuggled into medical journals thanks to a loophole in the regulations, say Italian psychiatrists Barbui and Cipriani in an important article.They focus on agomelatine, a recently-approved antidepressant. But their point applies to all of medicine, not just psychiatry.Here's the problem. Nowadays, major medical journals have rules governing systematic reviews and meta-analyses of clinical trial data. If you want to review the evidence about how well a certain drug works, or its safety, you've got to do it properly. You have to consider all of the data, not just focus on the results that suit you. And so on.However, these rules don't apply to "narrative" review papers, which is a broad term meaning any kind of article meant to give a discussion of the pharmacology, history, chemistry etc. behind a particular drug. For a narrative review, there are no rules.In particular, you can write about the clinical trial data in such articles with no restrictions. Unlike in a proper systematic review, you can cherry-pick trials and so on to your heart's content. Some narrative reviews have so much clinical data in them that they end up being, in effect, a bad systematic review. One that would never have been deemed acceptable as a systematic review.Barbui and Cipriani argue that narrative reviews are often used in this way, namely to paint drugs in a positive light. In the case of agomelatine, they mention a number of recent narrative reviews which were supposedly about the drug's mechanism of action, but which actually contained extensive (but biased) reviews of the clinical trial data.It's not hard to see how pharmaceutical companies might take advantage of this process. However, the problem is surely not limited to agomelatine. It's a loophole that affects every branch of medicine:Most medical journals require adherence to the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA). It is an evidence-based minimum set of items for reporting in systematic reviews and meta-analyses. Adherence to PRISMA is not required in review articles dealing with basic science issues as these articles are not focused on clinical trials.In practice, however, the agomelatine case indicates that clinical data are regularly included and reviewed with no reference to the rigorous requirements of the PRISMA approach. These articles have this way became a modern Trojan horse for reintroducing the brave old world of narrative-based medicine into medical journals.How do we stop this? It's simple, the authors say: just make all references to clinical data subject to PRISMA, or other accepted regulations, whatever the supposed 'primary focus' of the paper:We argue that medical journals should urgently apply this higher standard of reporting, which is already available, easy to implement and inexpensive, to any form of clinical data presentation.Of course, there are plenty of good narrative reviews that really do cover the pharmacology or other science in a useful way. The problem is not narrative reviews as such, but the way they're used.Barbui, C., and Cipriani, A. (2012). Agomelatine and the brave old world of narrative-based medicine Evidence-Based Mental Health, 15 (1), 2-3 DOI: 10.1136/ebmh.2011.100485... Read more »

  • January 20, 2012
  • 01:31 PM
  • 166 views

The Age (Cohort) of Autism

by Neuroskeptic in Neuroskeptic

New data shed light on the recent mysterious rise in the number of kids being diagnosed with autism.The new research doesn't explain the increase, but it tells us more about it. It shows that the rise in Californian autism diagnoses (reported to the state DDS) over the period 1996 to 2005 was a cohort effect, meaning that the rates of diagnosis have got higher, the later a child was born.A child who's 10 today (born 2002) has double of the chance of having a recorded diagnosis compared to a 14-year-old born just four years earlier, in 1998."That doesn't tell us anything new!" you might object (I did at first). "All that means is that rates have risen, and we knew that already". But actually it does tell us something important. Because the data could have turned out differently; rates could have risen without a cohort effect, if, in recent years, lots of diagnoses were being handed to children regardless of their age.That didn't happen. Almost all children in California who get a diagnosis, get it at age 3 or 4. In more recent years, the average age at diagnosis actually fell slightly. The peak used to be age 4, it's now 3.So it's not that children in general have been getting diagnosed with autism more. It's that young children are getting diagnosed more; children aren't being diagnosed "retrospectively", as it were.Another interesting finding is that the rise in rates of 'high-functioning' autism has been much bigger than the rise in low-functioning autism (i.e. autism alongside intellectual disability), although that has risen as well.So what does this mean?These data are consistent with various interpretations. It could be that rates of autism have really risen in California over this time period. But it could also be that people are getting more likely to detect and diagnose it - in young children.Keyes, K., Susser, E., Cheslack-Postava, K., Fountain, C., Liu, K., and Bearman, P. (2011). Cohort effects explain the increase in autism diagnosis among children born from 1992 to 2003 in California International Journal of Epidemiology DOI: 10.1093/ije/dyr193... Read more »

  • January 19, 2012
  • 03:33 AM
  • 92 views

Challenging the Antidepressant Severity Dogma?

by Neuroskeptic in Neuroskeptic

Regular readers will be familiar with the idea that "antidepressants only work in severe depression".A number of recent studies have shown this. I've noted some important questions over how we ought to define "severe" in this context, and see the comments here for some other caveats, but I'm not aware of any studies that directly contradict this idea.Until now. A new paper has just come out which seeks to challenge this dogma - not the author's term, but I think it's fair to say that the severity theory is becoming a dogma, even if it's an evidence-based one (but then, all dogmas start out seeming reasonable).However, while the new paper is interesting, I think the dogma survives intact.The authors went through the archives of all of the trials of antidepressants for depressive disorders conducted at the famous New York State Psychiatric Institute for the past 30 years. They excluded any patients who were severely depressed, and just looked at the milder cases. The drugs were mostly the older tricyclic antidepressants.With a mean HAMD17 score of about 14, the patients they looked at were certainly mild. By comparison, most trials today have a mean of well over 20, and according to the main studies supporting the severity dogma, you need a score of about 25ish to benefit substantially:So what happened? They reanalyzed 6 trials with over 800 patients. Overall there was a highly significant effect of antidepressants over placebo in mild depression, with an effect size d=0.52, or about 3.5 HAMD points. This is actually better than most other studies have found in "severe" depression. If valid, these results would torpedo the severity theory.This seems very interesting... but. There's a big but (I cannot lie). Although the authors say they wanted to include all the relevant trials from the NYSPI, they only had access to the data from 6. There were another 6 projects, but they were "pharmaceutical company studies from which data were not released to the investigators."This pretty much wrecks the whole deal. If those 6 studies all found no benefit of the drug, the overall average results would be much less impressive. We have no way of knowing what those studies found, but I'd wager that most of them were negative, because of publication bias - we know that drug companies tend to publish positive studies and bury negative ones. Or at least they did, at the time these studies took place (there are better regulations now).By contrast, severity dogma classic Kirsch et al (2008) avoided publication bias by looking at unpublished data. Fournier et al (2010), the other major severity study, didn't but the data were very similar to Kirsch et al so it's not hard to believe them.So in my view, until we know what happened in the other 6 trials, we can't really interpret these results, and the severity theory stands.Stewart, J., Deliyannides, D., Hellerstein, D., McGrath, P., and Stewart, J. (2011). Can People With Nonsevere Major Depression Benefit From Antidepressant Medication? The Journal of Clinical Psychiatry DOI: 10.4088/JCP.10m06760... Read more »

Stewart, J., Deliyannides, D., Hellerstein, D., McGrath, P., & Stewart, J. (2011) Can People With Nonsevere Major Depression Benefit From Antidepressant Medication?. The Journal of Clinical Psychiatry. DOI: 10.4088/JCP.10m06760  

  • January 13, 2012
  • 03:02 AM
  • 142 views

Dolphins who Dream of Whales

by Neuroskeptic in Neuroskeptic

Once in a while you come across a paper that can only be described as lovely. This is one: Do dolphins rehearse show-stimuli when at rest?Five dolphins lived in a certain aquarium in France. Every day, they put on shows for people - jumping around, that kind of thing. One day the aquarium started playing a 20-minute clip of "intro music" for the show. This consisted of various oceanic sounds including sea birds, dolphin noises and some whale-song.What happened next was amazing. About a month about they brought in the intro sounds, the researchers noticed some odd sounds coming from the dolphins, late at night. It turned out that the dolphins had started making whale noises.They only did this at night, mostly between 1 am and 3 am, when they were resting, possibly even sleeping. No-one trained them to do this. The "atypical vocalizations" were much lower than the dolphin's normal whistles, and also lasted longer.Unfortunately, it wasn't possible to tell how many of the dolphins did this.The authors recorded the dolphin's whale impressions with an underwater microphone, and played them back to a sample of 20 biologists, who weren't told the hypothesis of the study. Many of them thought they were whale-song, especially when the clips were slowed down to half-speed, dolphin's voices being "higher" than whales'.Why the dolphins did this is a mystery. All of them had been born in captivity, so they'd never encountered a real whale. One theory is that they were mentally rehearsing the events of the day to come. Maybe they were even dreaming about them and "talking in their sleep" - although this is unclear, because it's not known whether dolphins dream; don't exactly sleep in the same way we do. The paper's open access and it even comes with some audio clips of the dolphins, although unless you're familiar with what they sound like normally these aren't very meaningful.Kremers D, Jaramillo MB, Böye M, Lemasson A, & Hausberger M (2011). Do dolphins rehearse show-stimuli when at rest? Delayed matching of auditory memory. Frontiers in Psychology, 2 PMID: 22232611... Read more »

  • January 11, 2012
  • 03:40 PM
  • 109 views

Do Brain Scans Sway Juries?

by Neuroskeptic in Neuroskeptic

Does seeing a criminal's brain affect jury decisions?Edith Greene and Brian Cahill ask this question in a new study which put volunteers in the position of jurors in a murder trial. The 'defendant' was guilty, but the question was: should they get life in prison, or death?It turned out that seeing brain scans didn't have much of an effect - but it's not clear how far the results would generalize.208 mock-jurors were randomly assigned to get different kinds of mitigationinformation about the accused. Sometimes, all they were told was that he had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, depression and a substance misuse disorder. Others were also given neuropsychological test scores showing that he did poorly on various tests of reasoning and cognition. Finally, some were shown brain scans on top of all that, scans which were described as showing left frontal lobe damage. All these materials were based on a real 2007 court case.What happened? When the defendent was said to have been assessed as probably "dangerous" in future, people who were only told his diagnosis of schizophrenia usually sent him to the chair. But when they were given his psychological test scores - showing that he suffered from cognitive impairments - they were far more lenient. Seeing the neuroimages had no effect on top of that.If the guy was described as posing a low risk of future violence, the verdicts were lenient, no matter what else they were told about him. In the real case, by the way, he got life.This suggests that brain scans don't exert a seductive allure on jury decisions, at least not over-and-above psych test scores. But I'm not sure how representative the results are. The 'jurors' were all psychology undergrads. Most were Hispanic (63%) females (67%). Are psychology students especially resistant to the allure of brain scans - and/or especially vulnerable to the allure of psychological test scores? No-one knows, but it's surely plausible.On some level, neuroimaging evidence clearly can influence people's decisions, like any other evidence; lawyers wouldn't bother presenting it otherwise. The question is how much of an impact it has, but that is surely going to depend on the details of the case as well as the juror's background; I'm not sure how much a study like this one, focussing on one example, will be able to tell us.Greene E, and Cahill BS (2011). Effects of Neuroimaging Evidence on Mock Juror Decision Making. Behavioral Sciences and the Law PMID: 22213023... Read more »

  • January 10, 2012
  • 02:58 PM
  • 180 views

The Plight of Psychoanalysis?

by Neuroskeptic in Neuroskeptic

A New York psychoanalyst reveals her concerns about the profession in A Letter to Freud: On the Plight of PsychoanalysisDinah M. Mendes's letter covers several topics, but I was struck by the sections that deal with the contemporary challenges facing American analysts. She paints a rather sad picture of analysts who spend years in training, only to find a shortage of people out there who want their treatment:At psychoanalytic training institutes it is often difficult for candidates to secure control or training cases—prospective analysands who sign on with analysts-in-training, usually at a low rate (sometimes as low as $10 a session). Here the issue is not the cost of the analysis but the low valuation of the opportunity offered—what might be regarded as the gift of self-knowledge.The gratifications of instantaneous communication—texting, Facebook, and blogging—are immediate and obvious and erode the value of the slow and arduous route to communication and understanding offered by psychoanalysis. We seem to be transfixed in our culture by the allure of performance and public presentation, and a climate in which the exterior signifies the interior, where what you see and hear is what is true and real (no matter how often this fantasy is belied) is not receptive to the ideals of psychoanalysis. She goes on to examine the increasing popularity of psychodynamic psychotherapy, approaches which draws on Freud's ideas but is much shorter (and hence cheaper) than classical psychoanalysis which involves hourly sessions, three times per week, over a period of years -To judge from the mushrooming of new institutes of psychotherapy and shorter training programs within established psychoanalytic institutes, many people are interested in becoming psychotherapists, while there are fewer candidates for traditional psychoanalytic training and for psychoanalysis as a treatment choice.For those who elect full-scale psychoanalytic training, the supply of certified psychoanalysts exceeds the demand in the population, and as psychotherapists they compete with psychotherapists of all stripes and denominations. The analytic institute can feel like a sequestered haven in which psychoanalysis is an “in house” specialty, tendered by training analysts (who have to earn their institutional stripes) to analytic candidates...In my years of training, the contemporary challenges facing the would-be practitioner of psychoanalysis were rarely if ever openly addressed, although many recent graduates find themselves with few and sometimes no analytic cases...All this, she says, can be seen in the context ofA zeitgeist in which the intrinsic and often intangible value of knowledge and education, and of self-knowledge and self-examination, has been supplanted by the appeal of material and pragmatic goals.Of course this is all anecdotal. I wonder if any analysts amongst my readers have thoughts on this?Mendes, D. (2011). Letter to Freud: On the Plight of Psychoanalysis The Psychoanalytic Review, 98 (6), 755-774 DOI: 10.1521/prev.2011.98.6.755... Read more »

  • January 9, 2012
  • 10:53 AM
  • 167 views

Men and Women - Alien Personalities?

by Neuroskeptic in Neuroskeptic

How different are men and women? Are they from two different planets?In the cleverly-titled The Distance Between Mars and Venus, the authors argue that personality-wise, the differences between men and women have been underestimated by previous studies because they used simplistic statistics.Traditional studies of gender and personality have given some men and some women a personality quiz, and calculated the average male and female scores on the different aspects of personality.When you do this you find that there are differences, but that the standardized effect sizes are fairly small, which means that there is a lot of overlap. Even on measures where men score above women on average, lots of men score below the female average, and vice versa, like this: Traditional studies of overall gender differences have looked to see the differences between the average man and woman on each personality aspect, and thenaveraged the differences on each scale to get an "overall difference" score. Which comes out as fairly small.The authors of the new paper say that this approach fails to capture the true difference and they give a helpful analogy of why:Consider two fictional towns, Lowtown and Hightown. The distance between the two towns can be measured on three (orthogonal) dimensions: longitude, latitude, and altitude. Hightown is 3,000 feet higher than Lowtown, and they are located 3 miles apart in the north-south direction and 3 miles apart east-west.What is the overall distance between Hightown and Lowtown? The average of the three measures is 2.2 miles, but it is easy to see that this is the wrong answer. The actual distance is the Euclidean distance, i.e. 4.3 miles – almost twice the "average" value. The main novel argument of this paper is that if you calculate the distance (technically the Mahalanobis distance) in 'personality space' between men and women then you get a larger value than if you just average the differences on each measure.The paper also uses a couple of other methods that increase the effect sizes, namely using 15 different personality measures instead of the more common Big 5, and adjusting the differences upwards to take account of the fact that quizzes only imperfectly measure underlying 'latent' personality traits.I don't want to get into the debate over how valid the underlying data are (a 1993 sample of over 10,000 American adults, used to standardize the 16PF questionnaire). There are lots of technical comments here. I'm going to focus on the distance method.It's a very interesting approach and certainly raises questions about merits of the old approach, which when you think about it, does seem a bit crude. But I'm not sure that the average person is talking about distance in a hypothetical space when they talk about "personality differences".As an analogy, consider the dog breeds Labrador and Golden Retriever. These are regarded as being pretty similar kinds of dog. On any given feature, the average differences are small, at least compared to the diversity of other breeds. They're roughly the same size, much the same build, coat type etc.They are distinct breeds. This surely means that when you take all of the differences together, they define distinct regions of "dog space" (which has dozens or hundreds of dimensions), with little or no overlap.Yet they are still regarded as similar. "Similar" and "distinct" are not mutually exclusive. In fact, isn't the definition of 'distinct yet similar' that two things separate in some kind of feature-space, but don't differ much on any one measure?So I would say that these data show that, while men and women may be distinguishable in personality, they could still be similar. This is something of a semantic point but not "merely" semantic: it changes the interpretation of the numbers.J. S. Hyde, who is most associated with the view that gender differences are small, makes a similar (or do I mean distinct?) point in her comment on the paper:The gender difference found is along a dimension in multivariate space that is a linear combination of the original variables transformed into latent variables...[but] the resulting dimension here is uninterpretible. What does it mean to say that there are large gender differences on this undefined dimension in 15-dimensional space created from latent variables? The authors call it global personality, but what does that mean?Her questioning of what the direction along which men and women differ means, is (I think) the same question I'm asking about whether it disproves the idea of "similarity", in the ordinary sense of the term.Finally, take a step back and the whole debate seems a bit circular because, by definition, "personality" means "things that differ between individual people". Things we are have in common aren't even in the picture. Two groups could differ in personality space but still be very close in the much larger space of "possible creatures". There's no personality trait for 'being human'.Del Giudice, M., Booth, T., and Irwing, P. (2012). The Distance Between Mars and Venus: Measuring Global Sex Differences in Personality PLoS ONE, 7 (1) DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0029265... Read more »

  • January 4, 2012
  • 03:04 PM
  • 168 views

Hot Sex Prevents Breast Cancer

by Neuroskeptic in Neuroskeptic

Breast cancer is caused by sexual frustration. Women should ditch their unsexy husbands and find a real man to satisfy them if they want to reduce the risk of the disease. That's according to An Essay on Sexual Frustration as the Cause of Breast Cancer in Women: How Correlations and Cultural Blind Spots Conceal Causal Effects, a piece that was published today in The Breast Journal.Really -Endocrinological processes are important targets in breast cancer research. These processes are also important in human sexual behaviors. I hypothesize that these processes are capable of adjusting or distorting biological active forms of specific sex hormones depending on experienced sexual stimuli. These aberrantly metabolized sex hormones will ultimately lead to breast cancer....My thesis is that breast cancer is essentially caused by sexual frustration. The focus of this hypothesis is aimed at the (un)consciously experienced tension and sexual dissatisfaction between the chosen mate based on socio-economic, intellectual, ethnic or cultural motives and the nonchosen potential mate who has more appealing sexual incentive properties.In most western societies the improved economic independence of women has not changed to such a degree that long-term partners are chosen entirely according to sexual incentive properties. If the selected partner has no or weak sexual incentive properties for the other member of the couple, it is likely that sexual frustration will follow in the long run (6), which ultimately will cause breast cancer in some women...WHY HIGHER SOCIOECONOMIC GROUPS OF WOMEN ARE MORE AT RISK...higher socio-economic group of women pay more than average attention to the assets or status of the potential partner(7)....The chances of some women from higher socio-economic classes to find a sexually compatible mate are considerably reduced. This is due to an often self-imposed very limited range of potential partners. In this group of women, high status of the potential partner compensates for the acceptance of physically less attractive men (9)...HEIGHT AS RISK FACTOR IN BREAST CANCER...These women have a disadvantage because they have a smaller pool to choose from if they want a man they will not tower over. This increases the chances to settle for a sexually incompatible partner...BREAST CANCER RISK IN NUNS... There are 15 references, but they're all about sex, not cancer. Thus we get a citation to support the statement that "If the selected partner has no or weak sexual incentive properties for the other member of the couple, it is likely that sexual frustration will follow in the long run (6)", but not for the rather more controversial idea that disappointment in the bedroom somehow leads to malignant mutations in the DNA of cells of the mammary epithelium.Well except the line that "aberrantly metabolized sex hormones" are responsible, which is the scientific equivalent of waving your hands and saying "woo".How did this happen? The Breast Journal, so far as I can see, publishes lots of sensible research. It may not be a major journal but it's MEDLINE indexed and ranked 143/184 for impact in the field of oncology, which means there are 40 cancer journals in the world that have less impact than it. If I had published there, I'd be a bit miffed that my work was appearing in the same pages. Thankfully I haven't but as a scientist I'm still insulted that this has been published in a scientific journal, and will be appearing on the shelves of libraries around the world under the heading "science". Stuger, J. (2011). An Essay on Sexual Frustration as the Cause of Breast Cancer in Women: How Correlations and Cultural Blind Spots Conceal Causal Effects The Breast Journal DOI: 10.1111/j.1524-4741.2011.01206.x... Read more »

  • January 3, 2012
  • 04:40 PM
  • 139 views

Antidepressants: Bad Drugs... Or Bad Patients?

by Neuroskeptic in Neuroskeptic

Why is it that modern trials of antidepressant drugs increasingly show no benefit of the drugs over placebo? This is the question asked by Cornell psychiatrists Brody et al in an American Journal of Psychiatry opinion piece.They suggest that maybe it's the patients fault:Participation that is induced by cash payments may lead subjects to exaggerate their symptoms [i.e. in order to get included into the trial]... Another contributing factor to high placebo response rates may be the extent to which the volunteers in antidepressant trials are really generalizable to patients in clinical practice. Since the initial antidepressant trials in the 1960s, participants have gone from being patients who were recruited primarily from inpatient psychiatric populations to outpatient volunteers who are often recruited by advertisements. At times, these symptomatic volunteers have participated in other trials. When we contact potential participants to schedule screening, they often ask to be reminded which trial we are screening for or mistake our research trial for a different protocol in which they recently participated. They then recount the tale of two "professional subjects" who claimed to be depressed and enrolled in two antidepressant trials simultaneously, without telling the researchers; it only came to light when someone involved in both studies spotted the duplicate names.I've been the victim of such nonsense myself, as have many of colleagues - it's a perennial watercooler topic. A few years ago I was running a study recruiting people who'd recovered from psychiatric illness. The main source of volunteers was online adverts.That study was a learning experience. What I learned is that House was right. We recruited about 20 people. No fewer than 3 turned out to have enrolled in other studies and lied about it. After I realized this I Googled the offender's names and two of them turned up in the crime pages of the local newspaper for various petty crimes.Another volunteer was left handed and, upon realizing that I was only recruiting right-handed people, discretely switched his pen to his right hand and then took 5 minutes trying to fill out a form with his off hand. He didn't make it in, but if I hadn't been paying attention he would have.So yes, it is a problem. However, it would have to be taking place on a massive scale for it to be having a significant effect on antidepressant trial results and this really seems pretty unlikely.In my view, the authors miss out on the real problem with recruiting depressed people through adverts:  depressed people don't tend to respond to adverts, because depressed people don't do anything. That's why they call it depression.Getting recruited into a modern clinical trial is actually quite a challenge. There are many pieces of paper to fill in, calls to return, appointments to attend. Turn up late to the screening visit, or otherwise make life difficult for the study staff, and you'll be marked down as "unreliable" and they'll find someone who plays by the rules. Modern trials are very expensive. The last thing a study sponsor wants is a volunteer who will end up forgetting to take their pills on time.Depression, unfortunately, makes you bad at doing things. You procrastinate, you forget, you put things off until too late, you have a change of heart and decide not to, you get cold feet, you can't be bothered... That goes for things as simple as cooking dinner in severe cases, let alone something as complicated as taking part in a trial.So while you wouldn't go looking for aquaphobic people in a swimming pool, I'm not sure we should be looking for depressed people through adverts.Brody B, Leon AC, and Kocsis JH (2011). Antidepressant clinical trials and subject recruitment: just who are symptomatic volunteers? The American journal of psychiatry, 168 (12), 1245-7 PMID: 22193668... Read more »

  • January 2, 2012
  • 06:36 AM
  • 130 views

What're You Lookin' At (When You Dream)?

by Neuroskeptic in Neuroskeptic

Why do our eyes move during sleep?Here at Neuroskeptic we've already asked why do we sleep? and why do we dream? There are plenty of theories, but no clear answers to either of those questions.We don't even know the function of one of the most famous sleep phenomena, rapid eye movements (REMs). It's been known for decades that during certain phases of sleep, the eyes show a pattern of rapid flickering movements, and that this REM sleep is when most (but not all) dreams occur.But what are the eye movements?In a new paper, French sleep researcher Isabelle Arnulf sets out the case for the "scanning hypothesis". The idea is that REMs represent the dreamer "looking at" things in the dream, just like waking eye movements - at least much of the time.Some say that REMs are nothing to do with dreams, and it's just a coincidence that they tend to occur together. They may just be random, perhaps with the function of preventing the eyes from drying out during sleep, or maybe just a side-effect of sleeping brain activity with no function at all. A possible analogy: males usually get erections during REM sleep, even though most dreams have no sexual content.There's lots of evidence that seems to support a deflationist view of dreams. In humans and other mammals, foetuses have lots of REMs, even though they've never seen anything. Lab animals with the visual areas of the brain removed also continue to display REMs, albeit not as many of them, and people who've been blind since birth have REMs.Anaulf disagrees however, and discusses her work with the fascinating REM sleep behaviour disorder (RBD). RBD sufferers seemingly act out their dreams. Normally, we're paralyzed during REM by an inhibitory system which causes muscle relaxation during REM. The eyes are the exception, because they have a separate nerve pathway (which is also why some otherwise paralysed people can still communicate with their eyes). RBD can be a symptom of underlying neurological disease, such as Parkinson's, but it can also occur on its own.Anaulf's team studied 56 patients with RBD over 1 or 2 nights (Leclair-Visonneau 2010). They found that the behaviours were correlated with the onset of rapid eye movements, although 80% of the eye movements were not accompanied by any actions. What's more, out of 19 distinct behaviours (ranging from running away from lions, to strangling someone), 60% were associated with REMs, and of these 90% were in the same direction as the actions.This directional coherence between limb, head and eye movements during RBD suggests that, when present, REMs imitate the scanning of the dream scene. Because the REMs are similar in subjects with and without RBD, we suggest the extension of this concordance to normal REM sleep.They suggest, however, that it may not be that the eye movements are the result of the dream content, but just correlated with it. It's not that something happens on the left in the dream, and then in response, the eyes move to the left; rather it's that whatever pattern of neuronal activity causes the dream, also causes the corresponding eye movements.Either way it's an interesting idea, although it does rely on the assumption that RBD is a good model of normal sleep in this regard.Arnulf I (2011). The 'scanning hypothesis' of rapid eye movements during REM sleep: a review of the evidence. Archives italiennes de biologie, 149 (4) PMID: 22205589... Read more »

  • December 30, 2011
  • 08:04 AM
  • 182 views

How Realistic is fMRI?

by Neuroskeptic in Neuroskeptic

How representative are fMRI experiments? Is "the brain" that we investigate with fMRI the same brain that we use outside the MRI scanner?A new paper from Bernhard Hommel and colleagues of Leiden in the Netherlands offers some important caveats. They looked to see what effect playing some recorded MRI scanner sounds had on people's ability to perform some simple cognitive tasks, while sitting outside the scanner.MRI is notoriously noisy. When you have an MRI scan you have to wear earplugs to protect against the sound but they only block out some of it. Opinions differ on whether the sound is pleasant or not. Personally I find the repetitive tick-tock rather soothing now, but then I've heard it many times over the years. First-timers can find it quite overwhelming.Anyway, Hommel et al found that while scanner noise had no overall effects on reaction time or accuracy, it actually improved performance on three measures of "cognitive control".For instance in a task in which participants had to respond to the colour of a circle by pressing the left or the right arrow key, they were slower to react when the circle appeared on the "wrong" side of the screen, i.e. on the left when the correct answer was the right arrow. This slowing of responses caused by a stimulus-response clash is called the Simon effect.The results showed that the Simon effect was reduced by noise. The same thing happened in two other studies: noise meant better performance.All of the noise effects were modest and the sample sizes were also quite small (14-18 per task, with everyone studied twice, noisy vs silent) but this paper joins a number of others raising questions about the representativeness of fMRI, with evidence that fMRI activates the brain and maybe even improves mood (although I doubt that last one). The authors' interpretation is that the noise made people pay more attention to the tasks, to compensate for the distraction, and that this means that fMRI studies may be biased in their measurements of cognitive control:Generalizing from fMRI findings to behavioral observations and vice versa seems to be more problematic than commonly thought, at least as far as control  processes are concerned. In a sense, then, investigating cognitive processes by means of  fMRI... is inevitably facing Heisenberg’s (1927) uncertainty principle, according to which the act of measurement can change what is being measured.To my mind the biggest weakness of this is that it only looked at noise. While scanners are noisy, that's not the only distracting thing about them: during an fMRI study you also have to lie down, in a small confined tube, and your only way to see the "screen" on which experimental stimuli are shown is indirectly via a small mirror which often doesn't give a good view.So ironically, I'm not sure how realistic this study is... Hommel, B., Fischer, R., Colzato, L., van den Wildenberg, W. and Cellini, C. (2011). The effect of fMRI (noise) on cognitive control. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance DOI: 10.1037/a0026353... Read more »

Hommel, B., Fischer, R., Colzato, L., van den Wildenberg, W., & Cellini, C. (2011) The effect of fMRI (noise) on cognitive control. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance. DOI: 10.1037/a0026353  

  • December 27, 2011
  • 11:00 AM
  • 199 views

Scanning The Brain While Looking At Scans

by Neuroskeptic in Neuroskeptic

A new study investigated what goes on in the brain when doctors make a diagnosis.Radiologists use X-rays and other imaging techniques to diagnose diseases - but in this study, they went into the scanner themselves. Brazilian researchers Marcio Melo et al used fMRI to record neural activity while the radiologists were shown an array of chest X-rays.Some of the scans showed evidence of disease, which the doctors were required to diagnose. There were also two control conditions, in which the stimuli were still X-rays but with little pictures of either animals or letters embedded in them, instead of diseases.The image above shows how it worked. As well as pneumonia, one patient has a severe case of Alligator Lung, while the other looks like they've got the Influenza 'B' virus.Now, the point of all this was to compare the mental process of making a diagnosis to that of seeing an object. The idea is that a trained radiologist sees particular diseases in the scans, in the same way that anyone can see an alligator.Activity during diagnosis, object-recognition and letter naming was very similar (compared to doing nothing); this presumably represents the visual and language areas involved in looking at the image, recognizing what it is, and saying it out loud:There were some slight differences, with the left inferior frontal cortex and the posterior cingulate cortex being more activated by diagnosis than animals. But this difference disappeared after controlling for the number of different possible descriptions the radiologists reported thinking about for each image.The authors conclude thatThese results support the hypothesis that medical diagnoses based on prompt visual recognition of clinical signs and naming in everyday life are supported by similar brain systems.Which seems fair enough, although it's important to remember that the diagnoses in this study were quite easy ones. The mean response time was just 1.3 seconds and only 6% of those split-second diagnoses were wrong. Unfortunately diagnosis is not always that easy.Anyway, this study is all very well, but why stop at chest X-rays? Last year I speculated on the fun neuroscientists could have with a real-time fMRI machine:You could lie there in the scanner and watch your brain light up. Then you could watch your brain light up some more in response to seeing your brain light up...We really need to scan people while they're looking at brain scans. Only then will we be able to understand the neurological basis of being a neurologist, and find the brain's looking-at-a-blob blob.Melo M, Scarpin DJ, Amaro E Jr, Passos RB, Sato JR, Friston KJ, and Price CJ (2011). How doctors generate diagnostic hypotheses: a study of radiological diagnosis with functional magnetic resonance imaging. PloS ONE, 6 (12) PMID: 22194902... Read more »

  • December 22, 2011
  • 05:20 AM
  • 201 views

An Objective Measure of Consciousness...?

by Neuroskeptic in Neuroskeptic

Could a puff of air in the eye offer a way to evaluate whether someone is conscious or not?Yes it could, say Cambridge's Tristan Bekinschtein and colleagues in a new paper about Sea slugs, subliminal pictures, and vegetative state patients.It's all about classical conditioning of the kind made famous by Pavlov. This is learning caused by the pairing of two stimuli, one of them unpleasant. So if I were to ring a little bell before, say, pepper spraying you, and I did that repeatedly, you would probably close your eyes whenever I rang that bell. Or just punch me, but you see the point.Anyway, the key is that there are two kinds of classical conditioning. In the unhelpfully named "delay" conditioning, the warning stimulus overlaps with the painful one. Like if I started ringing my bell, then kept ringing it while I sprayed you with my other hand. In other words, there is no delay between the two stimuli... I said it was badly named.By contrast in "trace", conditioning there is a delay - the warning stops shortly before the second stimulus. Bekinschtein et al argue that trace conditioning requires conciousness. While delay conditioning can occur without awareness of the link between the two stimuli, only conscious awareness can bridge the time gap in trace conditioning.In trace experiments (in which rather than pepper spray, the unpleasant stimulus is just a puff of air in the eye), people who, when asked, can't explain the relationship ("sound means puff") don't learn to blink when they hear the sound. But with delay conditioning, this "unconscious" conditioning can occur. Likewise, under anaesthesia, trace conditioning is lost.At first glance this looks like a piece of psychological trivia, but it could have literally life-or-death consequences. If trace conditioning is a measure of concious awareness then it could be used as a way of working out whether brain-injured people in a "coma" or "vegetative state" are aware or not.This paper is in fact a follow-up to the author's own 2009 study showing that some people in a vegetative state do show trace conditioning - and the ones who did were more likely to subsequently wake up. One snag is that the humble sea slug, Aplysia, can undergo trace conditioning, yet it is presumably not conscious, at least not in any recognizable senseBut Bekinschtein et al say that trace conditioning is a product of convergent evolution. Alplysia can do it and we can do it, but we use different means to the same end. Their argument is that while in Alpysia trace conditioning is known to be dependent on just a handful of individual neurons in the creature's tiny "brain", in humans it requires an intact hippocampus (containing millions of cells). People with hippocampal damage, who suffer amnesia, also can't do trace conditioning.That's a good point but does that mean such hippocampal patients aren't concious? That would be weird because, apart from the amnesia, they seem perfectly normal. Presumably they're just not concious of the relationship between things separated in time...Also, primitive pathways for conditioning might still exist in humans, able to reactivate under special conditions. They do acknowledge this with a discussion of experiments showing that trace conditioning in the absence of conscious awareness of the relationship can occur but only when the warning stimuli are "scary", like pictures of snakes. They say that with generic, neutral stimuli there is no good evidence of unconscious trace conditioning, but this seems like a fairly fine distinction.Ultimately, it's a very nice idea but only more studies on "unconscious" patients will tell us whether it's really able to measure consciousness in a useful way.Bekinschtein TA, Peeters M, Shalom D, and Sigman M (2011). Sea slugs, subliminal pictures, and vegetative state patients: boundaries of consciousness in classical conditioning. Frontiers in psychology, 2 PMID: 22164148... Read more »

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